The simplicity of SMTP mail can be combined with t he robustnessof the sendmail MTA program and misused in numerous ways to create extraordinary and p o werful e-mail bombs. These e-mail bombs can be launched in many different a ttack scenarios which can easily ood and s h ut d o wn chains of SMTP mail servers. Sendmail-based SMTP mail relays also can be used covertly to distribute m essages and les that could be very damaging t o t he i n tegrity a n d brands of victims. This paper discusses mail-bombing t echniques, automated attack t ools, and countermeasures. Also discussed is an actual Internet based attack t hat w as launched in 1997 on the Langley AFB SMTP e-mail infrastructure. We also present a n a n alysis of the cyber-attack, graphs illustrating t he a ttack-volume, and a s t atistical e-mail bomb early-warning system.
I. Introduction
Many v ariations of sendmail are used on a wide v ariety of systems in the I n ternet that facilitate t he exchange of electronic mail. The basic design requirement o f sendmail is simply this -no e-mail message should ever be lost. Consequently, t he sendmail algorithm is extremely robust. For example, if the sendmail sending process cannot conrm that a m essage was delivered, the process repeatedly attempts t o d eliver the m essage 1 .
In fact, sendmail is so robust that i f t he d elivery mechanism times-out w h en processing a large mailing list, some versions of sendmail return to t he beginning o f t he l i s t a n d resends the m essage to e v eryone. At o t her times, however, sendmail has locked up when attempting t o d eliver noncompliant remote addresses, e ectively denying service to the remainder of the m ail queue 1 . The complexity a n d robustness of the sendmail algorithm makes it very di cult to d efend against sendmail-based denial-of-service attacks.
Covert Material Pranks
Other Political ood the e-mail server so that it becomes unavailable or is unserviceable. These e-mail attacks may also be used to forge the i d entity o f t he a ttacker, degrade t he a vailability of communications systems, undermine t he i n tegrity o f organizations, or to c o vertly distribute illicit material. Langley AFB actively engaged in e orts to stop sendmail-based mail transfer agents MTAs from being used as underground SMTP servers. E-mail servers were being used to distribute pornography a n d o t her inappropriate e-mail as illustrated in Figure one . Initial countermeasures to s h unt t he distribution of covert e-mail resulted in large volumes of e-mail bombs directed at t he M T A, graphically illustrated in Figure six , which became known as the Langley Cyber Attack. This paper describes the actual Langley Cyber Attack, e-mail bombing t echniques, mailbombing t ools, and countermeasures.
The following section provides a brief review of the t echnology and an in-depth discussion into e-mail bombing techniques. The Langley Cyber Attack, the countermeasu r e s u s e d , a n d t he early warning system designed to alert against the a ttack are discussed in section III. The cyber attack section also presents a brief analysis of the results. In order to be complete, section IV contains a brief discussion on cryptographic e-mail bomb countermeasures. A s i d ebar hosts a n o verview of a few automated e-mail bombing programs widely available via the I n ternet.
II. Electronic Mail Bombs
There are many e-mail bombing t ools and t echniques freely available to t he p u blic. There are also myriad reasons for cyber-citizens to s e n d e-mail bombs. For example, according t o a recent survey 2 , ve percent o f t he recipients o f I n ternet junk mail retaliate b y s e n ding m ail bombs and executing o t her denial-of-service attacks.
In this section we review many o f t he t echniques exploited and used for creating p o werful e-mail bombs on the I n ternet. These techniques include chain bombs, error message bombs, covert distribution and mail exploder exploitation. T h ere are other techniques as well. This section covers a large subset of these e-mail bombing t echniques.
A. Brief Review of E-mail Concepts
Transferring e-mail between users on a single machine is a relatively trivial process. However, transporting e-mail between a wide-array of TCP IP hosts a n d servers globally across the I n ternet can be quite complex. The protocol used to transport mail across the I n ternet is the SMTP 3 , but the actual transport management of global e-mail requires a m uch more complex electronic infrastructure.
Servers and programs with a p r i m ary function to s t ore and forward e-mail across the v ast canyons of cyberspace are referred to a s M T As. A mail transfer agent MTA is a very specialized program which d elivers and transports email between mail servers. On the o t her hand, a mail user agent MUA may be any o n e o f a v ast number of programs users execute t o read, compose, reply, a n d m anage e-mail locally. T h e widely used sendmail program is an MTA 4 .
SMTP messages consist of lines of ASCII text of information in a rigid format followed by t he m ain body of the m essage. The rigidly-formated section is known as the header. R F C 822 5 de nes the syntax and speci cation of the SMTP header, created to allow simple parsers to process the general structure of messages without knowledge of the d etailed structure of individual header elds.
The sendmail MTA w as designed to m anage a very complex internetworking e n vironment a n d i s o n e o f t he cornerstones of the I n ternet 4 . One o f t he m yriad technical requirements for sendmail was the n ecessity t o process addresses that are in route address syntax 4 6 . These addresses follow a syntax created for directed source message routing: MTA 1 ; MTA 2 ; MTA n : userMTA n+1 1 In route address syntax, this expression translates to: 1. the originator sends the m essage to MTA 1 , 2. MTA 1 sends the m essage to MTA 2 , 3. MTA 2 sends the m essage to MTA n , 4. MTA n sends the m essage to MTA n+1 , 5. MTA n+1 delivers the m essage to user. The capability o f sendmail to process route addressing is but o n e o f n umerous uncountable special rules and expressions which a robust universal MTA m ust manage. The next section discusses how t his syntax is exploitedto create extraordinary e-mail bombs. The reader is kindly referred to Brian Costales and Eric Allman excellent book on sendmail 4 for further reading o n t he sendmail MTA a n d i t s capabilities.
B. Chain Bombs
Most sendmail con gurations will process e-mail addresses which are in route address syntax described above. The e-mail bomber exploits t he route address functionality to create a v ery powerful e-mail bomb w e refer to a s chain bombing. Figure two illustrates the c hain bomb vulnerability.
In the c hain-bomb scenario, the e-mail bomber, H bomber , executes an automated script with a c hain of source routed SMTP messages. The e-mail bombs are delivered and queued on the rst MTA i n t he c hain, MTA 1 . I f t he a ttack volume o f t he e-mail bomb is su cient t o inhibit or deny service to MTA 1 , t he remaining m essages in the o u tbound queue of the b o m bing h ost will be directed automatically to MTA 2 . This process continues for all the M T As. 1 the symbol is used instead of the a t sign" becau s e o f a t ypesetting problem; this requires correction by t he p u blisher, thanks. T h e process is repeated through all the MTAs in the c hain, either successfully queuing t he e n tire e-mail bomb or queuing a percentage of the v olume o f t he bomb; then moving t o ood the n ext MTA i n t he c hain.
Depending o n t he con guration of the M T As, service may be denied due to n umerous factors. For example, when the volume o f t he m ail in the M T A queue is extremely large; the n umb e r o f a vailable le descriptors can exceed operating system parameters or the n umb e r o f o pen TCP connections can reach system limits. The large volume o f t he e-mail in the M T A queue must be systematically moved out o f t he queue, both o perational and m alicious e-mail, and t he M T A restarted or the system rebooted. Sorting m alicious from important business e-mail is di cult a n d v ery resource intensive.
Examples from the Langley Cyber Attack reveal that u nsuspecting m ail system administrators often are unaware that t he M T A h as been attacked by a m ail bomb a n d simply reboots t he m ail server without clearing t he malicious messages from the M T A queue. In this case, the sendmail process will re-initiate t he process again, attempting t o d eliver the b o m b t o t he n ext MTA i n t he route address chain.
C. Error Message Bombs E-mail bombers also exploit the feedback m echanisms of mail systems by u s i n g legitimate error messages generated by M T As. Figure three illustrateshow a n M T A is exploited by m asquerading t he source address of the s e n der and t he system responds with error messages that are delivered to the M T A o f t he victim. In this attack scenario, the b o m ber inserts t he e-mail address of the victim's e-mail server, MTA 2 , a s t he origin of the m essage, and s e n ds the e-mail bomb t o MTA 1 . MTA 1 was con gured to generate feedback m essages to t he o r iginator when one o f m any error conditions are generated.
MTA 1 generates an error message, or in the case of an e-mail bomb, large volumes of error messages, and forwards them to t he victim MTA 2 . Depending o n t he robustness and con guration of MTA 2 , e i t her MTA 2 is taken out o f service, or the e n d-users mailbox, MUA user , is ooded.
Many w ell-intended system administrators accidently con gure their systems to be exploited in this manner. One scenario occurs when an MTA h as been e-mail bombedand the system administrator con gures the m ail server to s e n d rejection messages on receipt of unwanted messages. An Internet based attacker simply inserts t he u nauthenticated e-mail address of the victim in the SMTP message and m ailbombs an innocent m ail server. The i n termediate server innocently responds with error messages bombing t he victim.
D. Covert Distribution Channels
Guluc a n d Tsudik 7 discuss potential anonymous abuse of re-mailers for the purpose of spreading libelous accusations, hate-lled propaganda, pornography, a n d o t her unpleasant content." The content o f t he illicit e-mail uncovered at Langley AFB validated this statement a n d i d enti ed a larger systemic problem. The t echnique of anonymously distributing c o vert les v i a a n eutral intermediate M T A is illustrated in Figure  four . The c o vert distributor, H distributor , uses route address syntax and insecure sendmail con gurations to relay illicit material to o t her MTAs. We h ave seen this technique used for private i n dividuals, the general public, and u nsuspecting n etwork users.
In addition, the recipient o f t he illicit mail can be easily fooled to believe t hat t he e-mail originated from an innocent victim's host machine. This poses a very real and d angerous method for criminals and m alicious agents t o victimize the I n ternet community. F or example, an MTA for a large bank in Tokyo could be used as a relay by pornographers. The recipient o f t he e-mail would more-than-likely falsely believe t hat t he bank was the originator of the illicit mail. This type of accusation is very di cult t o d efend against and it could be extremely damaging t o t he i n tegrity o f t he bank's brand a n d reputation.
E. Exploiting Mail Exploders and List Servers
A mailing list is a community of e-mail addresses that can be reached by s e n ding a s i n gle message to o n e address, known as the list address. E-mail sent t o t he a utomated mailing list is redistributed to all subscribers to t he l i s t 8 . Automated list servers like Majordomo This attack scenario can be combined with o t her bombing t echniques or executed stand-alone. In a nutshell, the bomber subscribes the victim, H victim , t o n umerous mailing l i s t s. Currently, most mailing l i s t s do not authenticate the s u bscriber; and t he list servers which d o a uthenticate use weak authentication mechanisms which m ay be easily subverted.
Herfert 9 discusses security-enhanced mailing list exploders as a way to provide strong a uthentication to posters on mailing l i s t s. However, these cryptographic techniques are di cult t o implement on a global scale, primarily because of the c hallenges associated with k ey management. In addition, the processing o verhead of encrypting d ata for thousands of e-mail messages must be considered. The topic of cryptography, relative t o e-mail authentication, is brie y summarized in section IV.
III. The Langley Cyber Attack
In January 1997, a commander within Air Combat Command A CC received an in ammatory e-mail message, apparently from President Clinton. The commander immediately understood that someone w as using SMTP mail to impersonate t he President. The c hief of the information protection branch w as directed to i n vestigate t he s i t uation.
The rst reaction to t he forged e-mail at Langley was to examine t he log-les of the sendmail based MTA. However, like most systems administered with limited resources, the level of auditing a n d logging o f t he M T A h ad been congured to t he minimum possible setting t o save d i s k space." The i n vestigators increased the sendmail audit conguration to provide t he m aximum amount of logging information possible.
The i n vestigation into t he Langley SMTP infrastructure uncovered a larger systemic problem. SMTP MTAs, accessible from the p u blic Internet, were being used covertly to distribute large volumes of pornography, bigoted hatemail, and o t her unacceptable and criminal messaging 10 . This discovery initiated a concentrated e ort to s t op all malicious use of the SMTP infrastructure while simultaneously ensuring t hat all legitimate SMTP mail tra c was delivered. To accomplish this objective, Langley AFB installed a simple rules-based lter, which pre-processed all incoming a n d queued SMTP mail 10 . These countermeasures were successful in preventing illicit use of the M T As. The rules-based lter is discussed in more detail in section III.C.
The results o f t his investigation into t he Langley Cyber Attack have gained national media attention. The results were discussed extensively in the United States Air Force USAF. In addition, the c hairman of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection referenced the Langley Cyber Attack as a critical example of an actual international cyber attack 11 via the I n ternet. Commercial organizations have since reported millions of dollars in damages resulting from forged SMTP mail originating from the Internet 12 . Interviews with t he system administrators SAs of the SMTP MTAs also uncovered very interesting information. The M T A often locked up," according t o i n experienced SAs, but t hey never investigated the c a use of the service disruptions nor examined log les to d etermine t he c a use of the system failures. Routinely, t he SAs casually rebooted the platforms and continued performing o t her duties that were assigned a higher priority.
Examining t he log les in real time s h owed a much larger problem on the e n terprise than isolated e-mail spoofing. Large volumes of e-mail originating i n t he I n ternet Figure six, were being d elivered to o t her Internet sites via the SMTP MTAs. Further examination of the e-mail being relayed covertly led to t he discovery that incredible volumes of pornographic materials was being distributed via the Langley MTA t o users at commercial Internet Service Providers. The largest numb e r o f t argeted users were AOL subscribers.
A. Initial Countermeasures
The n eed to learn the i d entity o f t he originator of the clintonwhitehouse:gov message was overshadowed by t he revelation that a n M T A a t Langley AFB was being used to covertly and illegally distribute pornography a n d h ate-mail. Figure one illustrates sample content o f t he illicit mail covertly relayed via the M T A. The concern for the reputation and brand of the e n terprise became t he p r i m ary requirement. If this underground distribution channel gained high media viability, u ndermined public con dence could result in potential damage to t he organization. The basic requirements o f t he countermeasures were nicknamed the Black Hole Strategy:
Do not provide a n y feedback or error messages to t he hackers or mail-bombers; Capture and minimize delivery of illegitimate m ail using a rules-based lter; Copy suspect mail for future analysis, delivering legitimate e-mail robustly and quickly; and Keep and m aintain all captured messages as potential forensic evidence. The initial reaction by n o vice network administrators is to use IP rewalls and routers to block t he a p parent source addresses of the e-mail bombs. However, experienced network m anagers familiar with m ail-exchange records MX 4 and t he robustness of the sendmail MTA u nderstand that t he address-blocking t echnique will not work i n t he vast majority of cases. In fact, chain bombing a n d o t her relaying t echniques make most attempts t o block speci c IP addresses relatively futile; traditional rewalls are simply ine ective. Finally, w h en legitimate relays are used by bombers and h ackers, attempts t o block t hese addresses results in self-styled denial-of-service attacks"; th i s i s a n easily exploitable countermeasure.
Sendmail Countermeasures sidebar
It is possible to con gure the sendmail anti-spamming features de ned under the check or checkcompat rule sets as countermeasures against many e-mail bombing t echniques. For example, these features allow sendmail to b e con gured; to not perform as a mail gateway, limit the size of messages, and reject certain sites known to s e n d e-mail bombs 4 .
The checkcompat routine requires the modi cation of the sendmail source code a n d, therefore, is quite di cult for the a verage systems administrator to implement. Beginning with sendmail V8.8, limited checking a n d rejecting can be accomplished with four rule sets; check mail, check rcpt, check relay and check compat. F or more information o n t he features, please refer to t he reference 4 .
During t he Langley Cyber Attack, we found t he sendmail built-in functions di cult for the a verage systems administration to con gure. The built-in ltering provisions were not exible enough to m eet all of our Black Hole requirements. In fact, inexperienced users of these rule sets i n ad-vertently con gured sendmail to serve as a relay for e-mail error bombs because of the error messages generated by t he MTA w h en under attack. Writing a rules-based lter which processed the m ail queue was found t o b e t he best defense against the e-mail bombs during our engagement.
However, sendmail is evolving, and it is of quintessential importance to u s e t he l a test release of sendmail in all MTAs. Sendmail developers have been re ning t he software to provide more user-friendly con guration options that can help mitigate e-mail bombs.
B. Filtering Queued E-mail
The t echnical strategy of our countermeasure against mail bombing w as simply to queue incoming m ail messages, lter the m ail based on developed rule-sets, and forward the clean mail. The l tering rule-sets triggered on information in the h eader control les of the m ail messages. The message content w as not used in the l tering process. All ltered mail was processed via one o f t wo p a ths. Mail was either sent t o jail," qjail, a n d not delivered, or copied into qcopy for further analysis Figure seven. Denying direct feedback t o h ackers was the cornerstone strategy.
During t he initial lter prototyping p h ase, we c o pied and delivered all mail with t he k eyword 'whitehouse' in the header elds because it was theoretically possible that v alid mail could come from whitehouse.gov." This was the prototype of a lter re nement queue which w ould become qcopy. This queue would be used to n e-tune additional rule-sets. All captured mail that w as taken prisoner was stored in the jail queue, qjail. Figure seven illustrates the o w o f e v ents for the l tering process. The SMTP server is started with t he -odq switch 4 , instructing sendmail to receive a n d queue incoming m ail, mqueue, only. 2 The l ter program is executed by crond8. T h e program processes the sendmail mqueue by rst copying all messages in the queue to another directory. I t i s i n t his directory that t he les will be processed. Incoming m ail continues to arrive i n mqueue and t he l ter program processes the s t aging queue, qprocess. T h ere are timers and a s t ate m achine t o a void moving e-mail which has not been completely received and queued by t he M T A.
The l ter rule-sets rst look in the h eader les the qf les for spoofed addresses without t he 0 0 character. These les are moved out o f t he qprocess into qjail and are not delivered. In addition, a subset of sender addresses with 0 0 characters are copied to qcopy and left in the s t aging queue, qprocess. T h e remaining m essages in qprocess are moved to another queue, qclean, a n d sendmail delivers the m ail by executing with t he -q switch, instructing sendmail to process the m ail queue; and t he -Q switch, specifying which queue to process. 3 
C. Rules-Based Filtering
Initial e orts t o track d o wn spoofed e-mail was the genesis of the rules-based lter, which began very simple and became m uch more complex over time. The t echnical strategy was to l ter incoming e-mail messages based on re ned rules-sets a n d forward the clean mail. Rule-sets triggered on information i n t he h eader control les of the mail messages. The m essage content w as not used in the ltering process. All ltered mail was processed via one o f two p a ths.
In the early hours of the l ter prototype, we discovered that a m ajority of e-mail bombs contained invalid originator SMTP addresses without t he 0 0 sign. Our rst prototype lter jailed all messages with i n valid SMTP address formats. However, our cyber-bomb o pponents a d apted, created bogus addresses with random 0 0 symbols. Our lters were actively probed by b o m bers across the I n ternet and across the globe in order to u nderstand h ow our lters were implemented 10 . Below i s a s m all code fragment, written in PERL, from the rst alpha v ersion lter prototype, illustrating simple rule-set processing o n t he h eader les. and we copy these suspected senders with data files to the copy queue, qcopy just in case elsif whitehouse i system" bin cp $Header $CopyFile"; system" bin cp $Data $CopyFile2"; elsif whistleblower i system" bin cp $Header $CopyFile"; system" bin cp $Data $CopyFile2";
closeQF; closeQUEUE;
then we move the 'good stuff' remaining out of the processing queue into the clean queue; usr lib sendmail -q -oQ usr spool qclean"
The b o m bers were adapting t o n ew lter rule-sets within 24 to 4 8 h ours. The most common bomb signature was repeated e-mail with t he same s e n der-receiver pairs. With few exceptions, this fact provided a successful indicator of hostile e-mail. We re ned the l tering algorithm based on this observation and provided the programming requirements t o the d evelopment t eam. This algorithm became a k ey element i n m i t igating n umerous types of e-mail bombs during attacks.
It is important t o brie y point o u t t hat t here are occasional exceptions to most lter-rules. Trapping all of the exception conditions at t he a p plication layer can prove t o be a di cult perhaps impossible programming c hallenge. It is impractical, from a resource perspective, to obtain a 100 percent solution. However, the tradeo of jailing a very small percentage of good e-mail vis-a-vis minimizing the risk and exposure to t he e n terprise wa s a m anagement decision, not a technical one.
The prototype lter design also provided valuable information which assisted investigators discover the content, type and origin of the criminal e-mail. Trapping a n d jailing politically charged mail became a high priority as our team began re ning l ter rules based on illicit e-mail origin, SMTP mailer, originator, sender-receiver pairs, etc. Our software development t eam provided numerous enhancements t o t he original lter prototype which resulted in reduced countermeasures manpower and improved lter granularity. T h e speed of the sendmail process receiving and forwarding m ail in real-time m ade queuing t he m essages prior to l tering n ecessary. The additional latency in the m ail-lter processing w as actually o set by performance improvements i n t he SMTP infrastructure. However, we did not quantify these observations.
In addition, by queuing t he m essages, the e n tire SMTP header le and control messages could be used in the l ter process. This proved to be extremely valuable in the process of examining m ail bombs, understanding t he n ature of the a ttacks, and s i m ultaneously insuring all e-mail was correctly delivered with minimal delay.
D. Mailbomb Early Warning System
As the SMTP lter used against the Langley Cyber Attack matured, SMTP mail denial-of-service DoS failures discontinued. However, the probability o f o verwhelming DoS attacks remained. Thousands of rogue e-mail messages continued to b o m bard Langley AFB servers. This bombardment created a pseudo steady-state condition of background noise. This steady state b o m bardment w as the basis for the implementation of our e-mail bomb early warning system.
Using a s t andard mathematical process we w ere able to identify an ongoing a ttack a n d provide a reasonable basis for predicting non-random future attacks. Beginning with the initial version of the SMTP lter, the i n vestigating t eam automatically collected e-mail statistics on the d aily volume of e-mail T d , jailed e-mail J d , questionable e-mail, and other variables of interest.
By keeping t he size of each w eekly subgroup, n, constant seven days, a pattern began to e m erge as we graphed and analyzed the raw data. Clustering o n e-week averages of jailed e-mail as a percentage of total e-mail volume i n equation one led to t he t heory that a s t atistical process control chart with a n u p per and l o wer control limit might serve a s a n e -m ail bomb early warning i n dicator. Daily e-mail statistics were automatically collected and averaged over weekly periods. denotes the d aily average jailed e-mail percentage based on a one w eek clustering interval. In addition, the range of the e-mail bomb v olume, R, was calculated equation three from the computed average minimum a n d m aximum.
The size of each w eekly subgroups, n, remained constant seven days. The t otal numb e r o f w eeks analyzed was represented by K. T h e o verall average daily e-mail bomb volume, , w as also tracked equation four.
From this simple statistical process, e-mail bomb u p per and l o wer control limits w ere established. Figure eight illustrates ten weeks of these statistics as they were collected and a n alyzed.
The u p per UCL and l o wer LCL control limits w ere calculatedby t aking a t wo percent s t andard deviation above and below t he a verage tra c including a ttack a n d legitimate e-mail volume. The d ecision to u s e t wo s t andard deviations exceeds the generally accepted one percent for normal distributions. However, a control limit that i s t oo narrow results in frequent searches for insigni cant e-mail bomb a ttacks false alarms which i s a n i n e cient u s e o f human resources.
Control limits Figure eight that are too wide w ould permit undetected signi cant e-mail bomb a ttacks. We simply estimated the initial upper and l o wer control limits from inspection of the graphs. However, as an early warning process matures and each sample outside t he prescribed limit is identi ed and eliminated, the v ariability from mean to mean should diminish from the initial value. At t his point, new upper and l o wer limits s h ould be calculated. These limits converge to a point w h ere an alarm is sounded at t he very start of an attack a s t he system matures.
A r u nning a verage exceeding t he UCL indicated that a signi cant e-mail bomb a ttack w as occuring. If the a verage fell below t he LCL, either the n umber of bogus e-mail had signi cantly dropped or the l ters were failing 4 . At t his point, adjustments w ere made t o t he l ter-rules to eliminate the process alarm.
The rst indication of a control limit breech surprised the t eam. Instead of a massive counter attack from the m ail bombers as had happened in the past, the rst Action Trigger Figure eight: Action Trigger occurred on the L o wer Control Limit. This caused the t eam to examine t he queues in an attempt to d etermine w h at t he h ackers were up to. Because the Langley AFB MTA h ad been hard coded into several automated tools see sidebar, those tools could no longer bomb victims because the Langley lter removed the illegitimate m essages from the I n ternet. Langley investigators found t hat t he a uthors of the t ools had removed Langley AFB from the l i s t o f M T As pre-con gured into t he b o m bing programs. The Black Hole Strategy proved to b e a n e ective a n d proven countermeasure which w e highly recommend.
We s t opped experimenting with control charts a t t hat point i n t ime. However, our next step would have been to d evelop a control chart based on the v ariance, standard deviation, or the range. This is an excellent area for further research a n d a n alysis.
IV. Cryptographic Countermeasures
Many o f t he t echnical vulnerabilities which m ake m ail bombing a serious threat could be signi cantly mitigated by enhancing t he security infrastructure of the Internet. Published by Linn in 1988, RFC 1040 13 discussed SMTP message encryption and a uthentication procedures. His continuing w ork i n R F C 1115 14 speci ed the cryptographic algorithms to support Privacy Enhanced Mail PEM, including t he use of public-key encryption algorithms.
Presently, t he PEM speci cation is contained in four RFCs which are all a part of the Privacy Enhancement The core security problem with e-mail bombs is the authentication of the originator. PEM and similar cryptographic e-mail services o er both symmetric and assymetric authentication, supporting a wide v ariety of cryptographic algorithms 5 16 . Methods for processing m ail addressed to m ailing l i s t s are also provided; however, cryptographic authentication remains problematic for e-mail transport 17 . The reader is referred to m any n umerous references on the s u bject 16 17 for a more detailed technical discussion.
Unfortunately, PEM provides integrity protection only on the body of a message. The h eader elds of an SMTP message are not protected because MTAs need to modify many o f t he h eader elds during e-mail transport 17 . As pointed out earlier, the e n tire SMTP infrastructure relies on a complex, heterogeneous internetwork o f M T As and MUAs. Therefore, cryptographic solutions which w ork robustly with i n termediate systems are very di cult t o design. Scalability a n d i n teroperability become complex technical issues which are very expensive t o d esign, implement a n d sustain.
Scalability a n d i n teroperability concerns are also major obstacles in the global management of crytographic keys, known as the e m erging Public Key Infrastructure, PKI. Combining a h eterogeneous public-key infrastructure with a robust global MTA infrastructure will provide t he d eveloper community with cryptographic tools to address email sender authentication. However, by n o m eans will a PKI solve t he e-mail bomb t hreat without M T A a n d MUA integration. Finally, PKI-MTA i n tegration may not signicantly mitigate t he e-mail bomb problem because PKI was designed to address con dentaility, a uthentication, integrity, a n d non-repudiation and not denial of service attacks.
All technologies that present n ew opportunities also propagate n ew vulnerabilities and risks. Emerging p u blickey cryptosystems are traditionallly viewed as defensive mechanisms; strenthening the integrity, con dentialility, a n d a uthentication of our electronic infrastructure. However, the widespread availability of cryptosystems create p o t ential o ensive t hreats t o t he infrastructure which are normally considered after design and d eployment. The interested reader is referred to an excellent paper by Y oung and Y ung 18 which discusses cryptovirology and cryptoextortion; emerging t opics which are out o f t he scope of this paper.
V. Summary E-mail bombing a n d impersonating t he s e n der have b ecome common crimes in cyberspace. The global networking infrastructure is used as a basis to a ttack t he i n tegrity of unsuspecting victims. Disgruntled employees, terrorists and i n dustrial competitors can use network-based e-mail bombing t echniques to u ndermine con dence in a organizations of trust. This type of attack on brand i n tegrity has the p o t ential to c a use major nancial damage to institutions; including n ancial services institutions, banks, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, publishing companies, law enforcement, government institutions, ad in nitum.
Our team uncovered and s t opped acovert channel for the illegal distribution of pornography, h ate-mail and pranks via standard operational SMTP MTAs. We actively engaged to protect the reputation, integrity, a n d t he brand of the organization. Unfortunately, it is extremely di cult for the general public to di erentiate b e t ween the a buse of legitimate resources by a h acker, terrorist, or criminal and direct misuse or negligence by an organization or commercial corporation. When the p u blic incorrectly perceives that a large multi-national business is distributing illicit material from its e-mail servers, this perception will undermine t he integrity, con dence and trust of the business. The results could be devastating.
Tools for launching an e-mail based attacks are dangerous, easy to u s e , a n d freely available on the I n ternet. Cryptographic mechanisms to a uthenticate e-mail are emerging. However, the ease an attacker might a buse and misuse the e-mail infrastructure of both commercial and f e d eral organizations puts t hese organizations at signi cant risk today.
Finally, t here exists a perpetual enigma i n t he I n ternet community regarding computer and n etwork security. Many professional are of the o pinion that security t hrough obscurity" is the b e t ter approach t o m anaging information security risks; whereas, containment of vulnerabilities is preferrable to o pen discourse. On the o t her hand, there are equally passionate o pinions for security without a m biguity"; whereas, it pays to h ave t he global community engaged as an open cyber-society, solving security c hallenges together. It is our hope that t his paper helps, in some s m all way, forward the o verall goals and objectives of the I n ternet community.
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Parker 15 de nes anautomated crime as one t hat is executed entirely by o n e or more sequentially executed computer programs in a computer" or computer network.
We m ust anticipate increasingly sophisticated automated crime, and t he packaging of easy-touse, free-ware computer programs that can be executed by almost anybody for fully automated criminal activities." 15 Mail-bombing t ools are examples of automated crime. These tools are dangerous, easy to con gure, and widely available on the I n ternet. The p o t ential e-mail bomber simply points a W eb browser at a search e n gine a n d performs a key-word search for e-mail bombing programs. A search will return pointers to programs such a s V oodoo, Unabomber, KaBoom, Up Yours, and A v alanche, described is this sidebar. These examples are just a few of the w ellknown mail-bombing programs that h ave surfaced on the Internet in the past few years. Each o f t hese tools has one primary objective: ood the m ail server so that it becomes unavailable or is unserviceable.
Automated mail-bombing programs vary in features and functionality. O n e group is more exible in the construction and con guration of the m ail bombs. Other tools allow random messages and SMTP headers rather than a statically identi able one. In addition, the b o m bing programs vary in installation and execution.
Many o f t hese bombing t ools come with professional quality graphical user interface GUI and v ery professional documentation. At t he o t her end o f t he spectrum, there are bombing u tilities that are executed via the command line and provide little or no documentation. Most mail-bombing tools attempt to provide full anonymity t o t he user. The next few subsections describe a few of the w ell known and freely available automated bombing t ools available on the Internet.
A. Unabomber
The U n abomb e r i s a W i n dows 95 based mail-bombing program that w as developed by Dead Elvis in 1996. Upon execution, a picture of the U n abomber the h ooded sweatshirt gure with d ark glasses appears before the m ain program window o pens. Unabomberhas a GUI main program window that allow s a u s e r t o s e n d m ultiple copies of the same m essage to a s i n gle recipient. From the m ain program window, the u s e r m ay construct the contents o f t he mail message and select the n umber of copies bomb size to s e n d. Unabomber also features" an on-line Help menu containing d etailed information on program installation and use. B. KaBoom KaBoom is a Windows 3.x and Windows 95 based mailbombing program that w as developed by The Messiah of The Alliance. Similar to U n abomber, Kaboom allows the bomber to construct an e-mail message and s e n d m ultiple copies of a message to recipients. Kaboom identi es 62 anonymous servers that is, servers that will bounce e-mail anonymously to assist the b o m berto o perate c o vertly. Kaboom also has built-in functionality which can be used to subscribe an SMTP user to 48 di erent m ailing l i s t s. Unlike t he o t her bombers, Avalanche comes with a n umber of con guration les that permits t he a ttacker to customize, create, and select random mail headers and m essages. Using a s o phisticated GUI, the b o m ber can select the n umber of mail messages to s e n d or can force the program to send m essages continuously until explicitly stopped. For anonymity, A v alanche features" fake m ail headers with several built-in anonymous SMTP servers. Avalanche i s distributed with o ver 20 pages of documentation consisting o f a d etailed user's guide, a Tips for Bombing tutorial, and a n Addon Implementation Guide. T h e Addon support functionality i s a u nique feature of Avalanche, which permits t he b o m ber to add new attacks and f u nctionality t o the t ool without recompiling t he source code. Also similar to KaBoom and U p Y ours, Avalanche can be used to s u bscribe Internet citizens to n umerous mailing l i s t s without their knowledge.
E. Voodoo
Voodoo is a UNIX based mail-bombing program that w as released in 1996. It is a small, easy-to-use, command-line program that i s s u p ported on both S u nOS and Linux. The current release of Voodoo permits t he b o m ber to s e n d 9 9 consecutive m ail bombs to a victim. However, the basic program can be combined with s h ell scripts a n d o t her software to create m uch more damaging a n d comprehensive e-mail bombs.
